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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper examines the history of U.S. interventions in
Latin America and attempts to explain their frequency by
highlighting two factors—besides security and economic
interests--that have made American interventions in Latin
America so common. First, immense differences in size and
influence between the United States and the States of Latin
America have made interventions appear to be a low risk
solution to crises that threaten American interests in the
region. Second, when U.S government concerns and
aspirations for Latin America converge with the general fears
and aspirations of American foreign policy, interventions
become much more likely. Such a convergence pushes Latin
American issues high up the U.S. foreign policy agenda
because of the region’s proximity to the United States and
the perception that the costs of intervening are low. The
leads proponents of intervention to begin asking questions
like “if we cannot stop communism/revolutions/drugtrafficking in Latin America, where can we stop it?”
This article traces how these factors influenced the decision
to intervene in Latin America during the era of Dollar
Diplomacy and during the Cold War. It concludes with three
possible scenarios that could lead to a reemergence of an
American interventionist policy in Latin America. It makes
the argument that even though the United States has not
intervened in Latin America during the twenty-two years, it
is far from clear that American interventions in Latin
America will be consigned to the past.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2001, Robert Pastor published an expanded second edition
of his widely acclaimed study of the dynamics of U.S.-Latin
American relations A Whirlpool: U.S Foreign Policy towards
Latin America and the Caribbean only under a new title,
Exiting the Whirlpool, which argued that the future of U.S.Latin American relations was not necessarily a hostage of its
past.1 In the short-term he appears to have been right.
December 2011 should bring about a new milestone in the
history of U.S.-Latin American relations. Baring any
unforeseen actions this will mark the 22nd anniversary of
Operation Just Cause making it the longest period in U.S.Latin American relations without a unilateral American
intervention since the Spanish American War. 2 By some
counts the United States has intervened in Latin America
hundreds of times during the last 150 years. These
interventions ranged from short-term missions to protect
American lives and property to full military occupations, that
included imposition of military governments, American
administered financial sectors, and American supervised
elections.
Military interventions have been a regular fixture in the
history of American foreign relations with the region since
the 1890s, with the exception of two periods: the “Good
Neighbor” era between 1932 and 1954 and from 1989 to the
1

Robert A. Pastor, A Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin
America and the Caribbean (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1992), and Robert A. Pastor. Exiting the Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy
Toward Latin America and the Caribbean (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
2001).
2
Operation Just Cause was the name of the U.S. Military operation that
removed Manuel Noriega from power in Panama.
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present. This later period now needs to be recognized as a
significant era in the history of U.S.-Latin American
relations. However, it would be naïve to think that this is an
entirely new era of U.S.-Latin American relations and that
interventions are now consigned to the past. By surveying
the history of American interventions in Latin America and
paying special attention to the contexts from which they
emerged, this essay will offer an explanation why American
interventions have been so frequent. Finally, this essay will
examine the possible developments in U.S.-Latin American
relations that could lead to a reemergence of a policy of
intervention.
Defining what is and is not an American “intervention” in
Latin America is a complicated issue. All States do their best
to influence the policies of other States in ways that are
favorable to them through diplomacy. At what point these
attempts cease to be diplomatic and begin to be interventions
depends on the criteria chosen. Two criteria will be used in
the definition of intervention in this essay. The first is
whether American uniformed military personnel were
unilaterally deployed for the purpose of obtaining a political
objective. The second is whether the U.S. military and
intelligence communities played a decisive role in
empowering a domestic faction to bring about a political
change that was favored by the United States. By these
criteria most landings of U.S. troops during the Dollar
Diplomacy era (1905-1932) and Operation Just Cause in
1989 would be considered interventions while the U.S.
response to the Haitian Earthquake of 2010 would not.
Similarly U.S. operation PBSUCCESS in Guatemala in 1954
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and the Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba in 1961 would be
considered interventions.3
EXPLAINING AMERICAN INTERVENTIONS IN LATIN
AMERICA
The frequency of American armed interventions in Latin
America during the 20th Century has made them a topic of
much debate. Scholars attempting to explain these
interventions can generally be placed into two categories:
apologists and prosecutors. The apologists explain American
interventions by arguing that American policymakers have
genuinely believed that Latin America is an area of vital
importance to the United States and so it has intervened there
repeatedly in the name of national security, even if in
retrospect some of these threats appear to have been
exaggerated.4 The prosecutors reject any explanations that
maintain American security concerns in the region were
3

Not all incidents in U.S. Latin-American relations can be neatly
categorized according to these criteria. For example it is unclear whether
or not the CIA played a “decisive” role in the 1973 coup that killed
Chilean President Salvador Allende or whether American support for the
Nicaraguan Contras played a “decisive” role in the Sandinista electoral
defeat in 1990. However, decisive or not, both of these incidents
produced political fallout in Latin America similar to that of more clear
cases of intervention and so are more similar in their effects to the type of
intervention considered in this essay regardless of how they are
classified.
4
For a sampling of the “apologists” see, G. Pope Atkins, Latin America
and the Caribbean in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1999); Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the
United States (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and company, 1943);
Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean,
1900-1921 (Princeton, IN: Princeton University Press, 1964); Thomas
Leonard, Central America and the United States: The Search for Stability
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1991).
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genuine. Instead, they decry these interventions as
neocolonial ventures attempting to establish American
economic and cultural dominance in the region. 5
The arguments of each group have some merit. American
security and economic interests in the region are real and
have from time to time been threatened. However, both
arguments fail to give a plausible explanation for why
American policymakers have so frequently chosen
intervention as a means to defend American interests there.
The “prosecutors” that claim that economics and power were
primary motivations fails to explain why the United States
intervened most frequently in the areas where Americans had
the least invested, such as Nicaragua, the Dominican
Republic, and Haiti. Also while there is evidence that
American business interests certainly have lobbied the State
Department to defend their interests, there is little evidence
that this lobbying had much effect.6 The “apologists” also
have difficulty explaining why the United States resorted to
interventions to defend their security interests in the region
when other policies could have addressed their concerns just
as effectively. For example denying foreign powers the right
5

A few examples of the “prosecutors” would be Harold Denny, Dollars
for Bullets: The Story of American Rule in Nicaragua (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1980); Karl Bermann, Under the Big Stick: Nicaragua
and the United States Since 1848 (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1986);
Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and
the Rise of the New Imperialism, (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books,
2006); Stephen C Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The
Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala, Anchor Books ed.
(New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1990).
6
For a detailed study of the American business lobby’s activities during
Dollar Diplomacy see Benjamin T Harrison, Dollar Diplomat: Chandler
Anderson and American Diplomacy in Mexico and Nicaragua, 19131928 (Pullman, WA: Washington State University Press, 1988). See also
the discussion of the 1954 intervention in Guatemala below.
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to intervene in Latin America could probably have been
accomplished through American naval power alone by the
beginning of the 20th Century, and such a policy would have
undoubtedly had the support of the majority of Latin
American nations. That the United States chose to forestall
foreign interventions with their own interventions certainly
requires more explanation than just concerns over security.
Besides security and economic interests there are two
additional factors that need to be taken into consideration in
order to understand the frequency of American interventions
in Latin America. First, the vast differences in size, wealth,
and perceived influence between the United States and the
republics of Latin America make interventions more likely
because these immense differences have often caused
American policymakers to overestimate their ability to effect
change in the region. This recurring miscalculation makes
interventions seem like low risk and relatively simple
solutions when political turmoil threatens U.S interests. This
miscalculation is sustained by interventions that have turned
out to be every bit as easy as they were supposed to be, such
as the 1954 overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz in
Guatemala and the 1989 overthrow of Manuela Noriega in
Panama, both of which obtained their objectives with
minimal costs to the U.S. in the short term. The same
miscalculation can also make the costs of not intervening
seem high in certain political climates. For example, during
the Cold War the cost of intervening in Latin America
seemed to pale in comparison to the political cost of
allowing a “second Cuba” to be created in Latin America, as
Jimmy Carter would find out when he was constantly
hounded by Republicans for having “lost” Nicaragua after
1979. In short one of the reasons that the U.S. has intervened
so frequently in Latin America is because the cost of doing
6

so in many situations has seemed lower than the cost of not
intervening.
Second, interventions are more likely to occur when
American fears about or aspirations regarding Latin America
coincide with the major fears and aspirations of American
foreign policy at the time. Such a convergence pushes Latin
American issues high up the U.S. foreign policy agenda
because of their proximity to the United States and, since the
costs of intervention in Latin America are perceived to be
low, proponents of intervention eventually begin asking
questions like “if we cannot stop communism/
revolutions/drug-trafficking in Latin America, where can we
stop it?” For example American fears about the spread of
communism in general during the Cold War made anxiety
over its presence in Latin America particularly extreme.
Conversely, when the dominant fears and issues of U.S.
foreign policy do not coincide with those Americans have
about Latin America, intervention is unlikely. For example
when Nicaraguan President and Sandinista leader Daniel
Ortega came to power in 1979 there was such widespread
fear among conservative American policymakers that it
eventually led to covert operations against the Sandinistas,
culminating in the Iran-Contra scandal. However, when
Ortega came to power through elections again in 2007,
George W. Bush telephoned him to say congratulations.7 In
1979 Ortega’s rise coincided with what was believed to be a
global resurgence of communism, whereas in 2007 Ortega’s
return to power in Nicaragua was no way connected to the
dominate issues in American foreign policy: global terrorism
and two foreign wars.
7

“Bush Congratulates New Nicaraguan President Ortega,” Reuters
News, January 8, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/01/08/usnicaragua-ortega-bush-idUSN0827392320070108.
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BRIEF HISTORICAL SURVEY
These two factors, the supposed low cost of interventions
and the convergence of Latin American issues with those of
U.S. foreign policy in general, can be seen driving American
interventions in the Caribbean Basin as early as the Spanish
American War. Behind the jingoism that jauntily encouraged
the U.S. to go to war with Spain was the argument that the
vast resource of the U.S. made victory all but inevitable, if
war broke out. The cost of liberating Cuba seemed so low
that it would be a mistake not to do it. At the same time
removing the Spanish from Cuba was a step towards
achieving many of the goals of early 20 th Century U.S.
foreign policy for the region, which included continuing to
minimize European influence in Latin America. Among
others, historian Kristin L. Hoganson has suggested a more
subtle convergence between the war and broader societal
issues by arguing that gender issues played a role in the
decision to go to war. A generation of American men raised
in the relatively comfortable and prosperous post-Civil War
Era worried that they were loosing the rugged nature of their
forebears and a war would be an excellent way of claiming a
more martial masculinity. 8
After the Spanish American War the United States took on a
much more active role in Latin America, particularly the
Caribbean Basin, and from 1905-1933 occupied Cuba, Haiti,
Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic for extended periods
of time, and landed troops in many more countries ostensibly
to end revolutions and maintain stability. This period is
generally known as the Dollar Diplomacy era, after the
policy of President William Taft (1909 - 1912), which
8

Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2000).
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attempted to end instability in the region through a mixture
of interventions and investments. There were both economic
and strategic motivations for these interventions. From the
perspective
of
American
policymakers
frequent
“revolutions” throughout the Caribbean Basin damaged
American property and investments and if these revolutions
were not checked, they might serve as a pretext for European
interventions. Ironically, this had been the case for much of
the late 19th century in the Caribbean Basin. Thus, the Dollar
Diplomacy era was different because of the convergence
between the issues of the Caribbean Basin and American
fears and aspirations in foreign policy. Dollar Diplomacy
coincided with the resurgence of European colonialism in
Africa and Asia, which many believed was isolating the
United States from economic opportunities abroad. The fear
that this colonialism could be extended to the Caribbean
Basin motivated American policymakers to take action to
stop it.9 Dollar Diplomacy also coincided with the height of
the progressive movement in the United States and its
impulse to bring reform. The success of reform movements
at home turned the attention of the progressive’s abroad and
created an American political environment that was receptive
to the idea of intervention.10 Finally, these interventions were
also undertaken with the belief that they would be easy. Dana
G. Munro, a diplomat-turned-scholar, who spent his years as
a diplomat embroiled in these interventions and then spent
9

Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean,
1900-1921 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 5 - 7.
10
For an overview of the internationalism of American progressives see
Alan Daley, Changing the World: American Progressives in War and
Revolution (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003); For work
dealing the progressives in Latin America during the era see, Emily
Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and
Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1999).
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his years as a scholar trying to explain them, concluded that
one of the reasons interventions were so prevalent during this
period was that intervening in “small weak states” seemed to
involve little risk or expense, while the potential benefits
seemed enormous.11
The best example is the decision to intervene in Nicaragua in
1912, which resulted in a nearly constant American presence
there until 1932.12 Beginning with Secretary of State
Philander Knox’s decision to support a revolution against
Nicaraguan President José Santos Zelaya and his immediate
successors, American statesmen moved hesitantly down a
path of attempting to turn Nicaragua into country that was
both stable and prosperous. By doing so they could limit the
likelihood of European intervention and also prove the
desirability and effectiveness of American led reforms. In
exchange for recognizing the rebels that overthrew Zelaya,
the State Department urged the leaders of the revolution to
sign a series of agreements known as the Dawson Pacts
which they believed would put Nicaragua on a path towards
democracy and financial stability. What they did not seem to
consider is what would happen if the new leaders of
Nicaragua did not abide by these pacts. The plan began to
break down almost immediately and in 1912, the former
Minister of War Luis Mena, who was more ambivalent to the
United States, began a revolt against Nicaraguan President
11

Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 19001921, 13.
12
For some of the best overviews of the Nicaraguan interventions see
Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-1921,
160 - 210; Isaac Cox, Nicaragua and the United States 1909 - 1927
(Boston, MA: World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, 1927); Michel Gobat,
Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua under U.S. Imperial Rule,
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), pt. II & III.
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Adolfo Diaz, who was broadly supportive of the Dawson
Pacts and American financial reorganization.
The political positions of the belligerents made it easy to
view this conflict as a dispute over the future of American
policy for Nicaragua. At the initial outbreak of hostilities,
the U.S. Navy landed a small force to enter Managua as a
legation guard, hoping this would intimidate Mena into
ending the revolution. When Mena responded with a fourday bombardment of the city, killing over 100 women and
children plus other casualties, President Taft became
convinced a larger force was needed and U.S. Marines began
landing in Nicaragua. The Marines’ initial mission in
Nicaragua was limited to protecting Americans and they
remained neutral in the conflicts between the government
and the rebels, largely because of a disagreement between
the State Department and the Naval Commanders over the
purpose of the Marines’ mission in Nicaragua. American
Naval Commanders on the scene warned that intervention
would involve a long commitment to a country where the
United States had few strategic interests, and so advised that
the Marines should only be used to bring both sides to the
negotiating table. State Department officials on the other
hand wanted to make Nicaragua a test case of the United
States’ commitment to guaranteeing political and financial
stability in the Caribbean Basin and so argued that the
Marines must put down Mena’s revolt. As Assistant
Secretary of State Huntington-Wilson wrote to president Taft
in the midst of the struggle with the Department of the Navy
over intervention:
We are having so much trouble in Mexico, in
Cuba and in Panama, and we have had for
so long frequently to express "grave concern"
11

and to lodge protests that what with the
attitude of Senator Bacon's group in the
Senate, which gives the impression that we
are a house divided against itself, the
authority of our words seems lessened. We
think that if the United States did its duty
promptly, thoroughly, and impressively in
Nicaragua, it would strengthen our hand and
lighten our task, not only in Nicaragua itself
in the future, but throughout Central America
and the Caribbean and would even have
some moral effect in Mexico. Such
consideration
in
addition
to
real
apprehension
for
American
citizens,
especially in Matagalpa, and a feeling that
excessive prudence was better than the risk
of any untoward incident, have made this
Department favor the most adequate
preparations even if they should prove to
have been out of proportion to the
necessities.13
In his letter to President Taft, Huntington-Wilson assigned a
greater importance to the Nicaraguan situation than was
justified by arguing that the United States needed to end the
revolution there in order to send a message to the rest of the
Caribbean Basin about what would and would not be
tolerated, which would by extension send a message to
Europeans that the United States was in control of the
13

Assistant Secretary of State Wilson to President Taft, August 30th
1912, doc. no. 817.00/1940a in United States, Records of the Department
of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Nicaragua, 1910-29, (Washington
D.C.: The National Archives National Archives and Records Service
General Services Administration, 1966), Roll 12.
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Caribbean. By making his argument this way, HuntingtonWilson made Nicaragua into a symbol of the ills of the
Caribbean Basin and the fears and ambitions the American
policymakers had regarding that region and made a conflict
that the United States should have been able to avoid into a
test of principle that seemed to important to ignore. His
reference to “preparations... out of proportion to the
necessities” indicates that he did not think the intervention
would be too costly or complicated.
The then U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua George T. Weitzel
explained the choice facing the United States in similar
terms. He told Secretary Knox if the United States acted
decisively to stop Mena’s revolution it would have a
"beneficial and lasting effect, not only in Nicaragua but
throughout Central America." Furthermore, Weitzel argued
that the United States had a responsibility to act, writing that
“This is a disagreeable but none the less clear duty which we
owe to our own self-respect and to Nicaragua which pleads
for relief and to the cause of civilization and humanity in
general.”14 Incredibly Weitzel described the situation facing
the United States as a crisis in which they had to take a
symbolic stand for the cause of civilization, not as a choice
between rescuing or not a poorly thought out scheme for the
financial reorganization of Nicaragua—a place of minor
financial and strategic importance even by Caribbean Basin
standards. The convergence between the Nicaraguan
situation and the more general fears and goals of American
foreign policy combined with the perceived low cost of
interventions there made a major issue out of a very minor
revolution.
14

Ambassador Weitzel to Secretary Knox, September 17th, 1912, doc.
no. 817.00/1988, Ibid.
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The interventions of Dollar Diplomacy turned out to be
neither cheap nor easy. While the casualties caused by the
interventions in the Caribbean Basin were low by 20 th
Century standards, they greatly damaged U.S. relations with
Latin America, as many Latin Americans failed to see any
great distinctions between American interventionism and
European colonialism. These interventions were also more
frequently the beginning of a long entanglement rather than a
quick solution to the political problems of the Caribbean
Basin. Despite these high costs, there was little to show for
these interventions.15 By the early 1930s the policy itself was
looking more like a security threat to the United States as it
damaged hemispheric unity and cooperation just as the rise
of Germany and Japan was becoming apparent. For the sake
of hemispheric cooperation the interventionist policy of
Dollar Diplomacy was explicitly disavowed by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt during the first term of his presidency
and replaced by what he called “The Good Neighbor” policy.
At the 1933 International Conference of American States
held in Montevideo, Uruguay, President Roosevelt
announced that the United States would renounce its right to
intervene in Latin America in exchange for greater
cooperation from Latin American countries on hemispheric
defense.16 This new policy was generally regarded with favor
in Latin America and between 1932 and 1954 the United
States government refrained from intervening.
The U.S. sustained the principles of the Good Neighbor
15

True European incursions into Caribbean Basin had been avoided, but
many at the time questioned how serious this threat was in the first place.
American financial supervision did have some positive effects, but it had
not made any of the countries that received it particularly prosperous.
16
Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York,
NY: Columbia University Press, 1961). Especially part III.
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Policy until 1954, when the fears and challenges of the Cold
War ushered in a new era of American interventions. The
U.S. interventions during the Cold War were different from
those of the Dollar Diplomacy era in many ways. They were
ostensibly covert and so, used proxies rather than actual
American forces, and when they employed American
personnel, it was often members of the clandestine services
rather than uniformed soldiers or marines. This is one of the
reasons the interventions of the Cold War have a more
odious reputation than those of previous eras. American
officials routinely argued during the Dollar Diplomacy era
that they were unashamedly intervening to defend principles
rather than narrow national interests. Architects of
intervention in the Cold War would occasionally attempt to
make the same claim, but the secretive nature of the
interventions and frequent disavowals of them seemed to
indicate otherwise.
A striking similarity between the interventions of the Dollar
Diplomacy era and those of the Cold War is how fears about
Latin America again converged with the broader fears of
American foreign policy to make Latin American political
developments seem more dangerous than they probably
were. For the thirteen days of the Cuban Missile Crisis in
1963 the presence of Soviet missiles on Cuba did make Latin
America the “most dangerous place on earth” as Kennedy
called it.17 However, the Cuban missile crisis took place
after, and in response to American interventions that
attempted to overthrow Fidel Castro in 1961 (the Bay of Pigs
invasion) and successfully overthrew the Arbenz
Administration in Guatemala in 1954. Some interpretations
17

Stephen Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F.
Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 7.
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of the overthrow of the Arbenz regime focused on the
machinations of the United Fruit Company and the
importance of American financial interests in the
Guatemalan intervention, but more recent scholarship has
discounted this as a major motivation of the CIA and has
instead focused on the ideological threat of Arbenz’s proSoviet ideology.18 Arbenz came to power in the middle of the
Korean War and since American policymakers had
committed themselves to stopping the spread of communism
in far away Korea, it was difficult for them to be indifferent
to its spread in Guatemala or to see that the two contexts
were different.19 It was the convergence between the
American fears about the spread of communism in Asia and
its presence in Latin America which caused them to view
Arbenz as a threat to U.S security; a proposition that without
this convergence would have seemed ridiculous.
Unfortunately viewing Arbenz as a threat and treating him as
such became a self-fulfilling prophecy as future communist
regimes in Latin America came to power weary of the United
States and more willing to look to the Soviets for support.

18

For economic interpretations of the intervention see Jos. M Aybar de
Soto, Dependency and Intervention: The Case of Guatemala in 1954
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978); Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter
Fruit; For more ideological interpretations see Nick Cullather, Secret
History: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala
1952-1954 (Standford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Piero
Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United
States, 1944 -1954 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992);
Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of
Intervention (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1982).
19
Bryce Wood, The Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy, 1st ed.
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1985), 152; Gleijeses, “Shattered
Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944 -1954,”
178 - 81.
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That the overthrow of Arbenz was successful beyond
expectations led to a shift in American thinking back in favor
of interventions. Once again interventions came to be
thought of as relatively easy and cheap ways to guarantee
American interests in Latin America. Unfortunately the
Kennedy Administration misinterpreted the CIA’s
involvement, rather than the active support of the
Guatemalan army, as the key to the success of the overthrow
of Arbenz; a mistake that greatly contributed to the fiasco of
the Bay of Pigs Invasion.20 As disastrous as it was, the Bay
of Pigs did not destroy the American belief that it should be
able to effect change in Latin America more easily than it
could other places. Although the Kennedy Administration
never fully gave up on trying to destroy the Cuban regime, it
did change tactics when combating communism across the
hemisphere. Rather than waiting for communist regimes to
come to power, Kennedy tried to preempt them through his
major initiative for Latin America, the Alliance for Progress.
This highly ambitious project, based on the best thinking
about development at the time, tried to make non-communist
development a reality across Latin America. Latin America
was chosen, as Kennedy told an aide because “Latin America
is not like Asia or Africa. We can really accomplish
something there.”21 The perceived convergence between
Latin American communists and a Soviet dominated global
communist movement stoked fears in the United States about
political change in Latin America throughout the Cold War,
while a belief that Latin America was a place Americans
could “really accomplish something” drove interventionists
policies.
The invasion of Panama in 1989 is the most recent U.S.
20
21

Cullather, Secret History, 7 - 8.
Stephen Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 30.
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action in Latin America and may be the best example of what
future interventions in Latin America would look like.
Operation Just Cause was the first, and so far only, unilateral
U.S. intervention in Latin America in the post-Cold War
era.22 In many ways Operation Just Cause was more similar
to the interventions of the Dollar Diplomacy era than to
those of the Cold War and argues against the notion that
strategic denial of access to Latin America of rival super
powers has been the determining factor in American
interventions in Latin America. Similar to the interventions
of Dollar Diplomacy, the American policymakers believed
Panama’s head of state, Manuel Noriega’s drug running,
political repression, and antagonistic actions were threats to
law and order in Central America and to American personnel
in Panama. There was no fear that he might become an
agent of a foreign power. Still, then Vice-President George
H. W. Bush advocated vigorous action against Noriega on
the grounds that “How can we make the argument we're
getting tough on drug dealers it we let this guy off?” 23
Associating Noriega with the newly invigorated war on
drugs in the late 1980s was a critical part of making the case
to remove him.
U.S. relations with Noriega worsened once George H. W.
Bush became president. Noriega’s repression of democratic
movements intensified and clashes between Panamanian and
American soldiers became more frequent, even involving
some casualties.24 These pressures came to a head in October
22

Eytan Gilboa, “The Panama Invasion Revisited: Lessons for the Use of
Force in the Post Cold War Era,” Political Science Quarterly 110, no. 4
(1996): 539.
23
James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace,
1989-1992 (New York, NY: Putnam, 1995), 179.
24
The option of dealing with Noriega in the Organization of American
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of 1989 when an attempted coup by some of Noriega’s own
officers failed and the Bush Administration was sharply
criticized for failing to decisively aid the plotters. The Bush
Administration was in fact sympathetic with the officers, but
the coup leaders themselves only asked for minimal
American help and constant American fears that the plot was
a trap set by Noriega to show the world the extent of
American aggression hampered cooperation.25 Warranted or
not, the coup was portrayed as a failure of the Bush
Administration and as the crisis grew more serious focus,
shifted from Panama to the ability of the Bush
Administration to wage the war on drugs, promote
democracy in Latin America, and to lead the free world in an
era when the international context seemed opportune for
American leadership.26 In this environment, the costs of not
removing Noriega seemed to be higher than the cost of
intervention and so the Administration determined that at the
next opportunity the United States would act decisively.
The death of an American Marine, the beating of another,
and the sexual assault of the latter’s wife by the Panamanian
Defense Forces all in the same incident was sufficient to
convince the Bush Administration to order the overthrow of
Noriega and execute the largest U.S. intervention in Latin
America in American history. Although the security of the
Panama Canal was occasionally mentioned in justifications
of the intervention, the argument that Noriega posed a threat
States (OAS) was also tried, but disagreements between member states
kept the OAS from being effective in this situation.
25
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to American security was never seriously considered.
Noriega did, however, pose a clear threat to the safety of
American citizens in Panama, especially those in uniform.
As James Baker explained in his memoirs, American
policymakers decided to remove Noriega after they came to
the conclusion that American lives would continue to be lost
whether or not they attempted the coup, and so it was better
to go ahead and remove him, which might permanently
resolve the issue.27 A key assumption in this calculation was
that no more than a few Americans would be killed in this
action and here again the perceived differences in power
between the United States and Latin American nations
played a key role in the decision to intervene. In the case of
Panama, however, American policymakers seemed to have
been right. The overthrow of Noriega did prove to be a
relatively simple operation, and, almost unique among
American interventions in Latin America. It resulted in the
establishment of a democracy rather than an authoritarian
regime. At some point in the future, if pressure to intervene
in Latin America reemerges, the Panamanian intervention
will surely be cited by proponents of interventions as an
example of what such actions can achieve.
The forgoing selective survey of American interventions in
Latin America has argued that while American strategic and
economic interests in the region play a role in the decision to
intervene, other factors need to be included to give a
plausible explanation for the frequency of American
interventions. These additional factors are (1) that the vast
differences in size, wealth, and perceived influence between
the United States and the republics of Latin America made
intervening there seem relatively low risk and (2) that
27
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interventions are much more likely when the general fears
and aspirations of American foreign policy converge with
particular American fears and aspirations regarding Latin
America.
LOOKING FORWARD
Surveying Latin America today it is reasonable to assume
that the conditions that have discouraged unilateral American
interventions there for the last twenty-two years might
continue for sometime. One of these conditions is that during
that time the major issues of U.S. foreign policy have not
converged with the major issues in U.S.-Latin American
relations. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early
1990s the issues that have dominated American foreign
policy have been failed states and international terrorism,
neither of which is currently a major issue in U.S.-Latin
American relations. With American attention focused on the
Middle East and South Asia, the issues of drug-trafficking
that currently prevail in the region and the reemergence of
leftists regimes in Latin America have not gained much
prominence in the United States, even though these are two
issues that have previously been used to justify interventions.
Also the two long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have turned
the mood of the American people decisively against military
interventions that might entail a long commitment. However,
it would be naïve to assume that the United States will never
again pursue a policy of unilateral intervention in Latin
America. The rest of this section will be devoted to three
possible scenarios that might lead to the reemergence of a
policy of intervention.
These last two decades of U.S.-Latin American relations
have not passed without challenges to American interests in
21

the region, the bulk of them coming from Venezuelan
President Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian Alternative for
the Americas. However, there seems little danger of
Venezuela playing the role in the coming decades that Cuba
under Fidel Castro played in Latin America in the 1960s.
While inequality is still rampant in many Latin American
countries, the anti-poverty programs of regional leaders such
as Brazil’s Bolsa Familia and Mexico’s Oportunidades
seemed to offer a more compelling development model for
most Latin American countries than Hugo Chávez’s 21st
Century Socialism.28 This is no doubt partially attributable to
the fact that under Hugo Chávez Venezuela’s economic
health has declined as his autocratic tendencies have
increased, alienating many Latin American countries that do
not directly profit from Venezuela’s petroleum wealth.
Neither have Hugo Chávez’s 21st Century Socialism or
Bolivian Revolution become major issues in the United
States, despite what at times seems like a concerted effort on
Chávez’s part to make them such. He has publicly and
proudly sought to make common cause with other nations
that espouse anti-American views, such as Iran, and has
even invited the Russian Navy to undertake joint exercises
with Venezuela, actions that would have alarmed American
policymakers during the Cold War.29
The muted American response to Chávez may be because
American policymakers have learned valuable lessons
28
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regarding the long-term diplomatic and political costs of
intervention—even of those that seem successful in the short
term. However, a greater part of the explanation is likely that
despite all of his rhetoric and bombast, fears about Hugo
Chávez do not converge with the broader issues of American
foreign policy. Since the Al-Qaeda attacks on New York on
September 11, 2001, the United States has faced an enemy so
dedicated in its opposition to everything American and so
determined to kill Americans and their allies abroad that in
comparison Hugo Chávez, seems quaint and at times
comedic.
The past however is no guarantee that Chávez will not
become a target of American intervention in the future. The
American led and then supported international mission
against Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi may influence
American views on interventions in support of democracy
for the next several decades to come. The intervention
against Qaddafi has reminded American policymakers that
when it comes to responding to calls to protect democracy
they have a range of responses available to them besides
doing nothing or undertaking an Iraq-style nation building
mission, which will likely remain unpopular for several
decades. In Libya, the United States led a coalition that was
willing to offer air support and supplies to a rebel group in
order to support a regime change, but was unwilling to
deploy any forces to ensure the success of the mission or to
control the composition of the new regime after victory. The
Libyan intervention was a definite departure from what was
informally known as the “Pottery Barn Doctrine” (“you
break it you buy it”) propagated by Colin Powell and other
less hawkish members of the Bush Administration, which
argued that once the United States intervened they needed to
see the mission through, presumably to an acceptable
23

(loosely defined) outcome.30 In Libya the Obama
Administration has demonstrated its willingness to “break
things” without “buying” them and as a result interventions
no longer seem as expensive as they did even just a few
years ago. There has already been some talk of Libya
becoming a template for future American interventions. 31
Such talk is directly relevant to U.S.-Latin American
relations because Libya could be used as a precedent to
justify some sort of action against a leader such as Chávez if
he would attempt to maintain himself in power after loosing
a future election. This could theoretically happen as early as
2012. If violence erupted in a similar manner as in Libya
and pro-democracy protesters appealed to the United States
to support them against Chávez, the pressure on American
policymakers to intervene in some fashion could be great,
especially with Libya offering an example of what a cheap
and effective intervention might look like.
Another possible scenario that could lead to the reemergence
of a policy of unilateral intervention would be a renewal of
superpower rivalries in the region. A constant theme in
current discussions of American foreign policy is the rise of
China, and what that means for the United States. Even if
China’s rise turned out to be less than benign there are
several reasons why it would be unlikely to spark a new Cold
War between the U.S. and China in Latin America. Perceived
Soviet gains in Latin America were so alarming for
Americans because they represented a failure of the liberal
political and economic ideology promoted by the United
30
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States and its allies. China’s rise, if anything, seems to prove
the validity of liberal economic principals. Even if a liberal
political ideology has not taken hold in China, the Chinese
do not seem eager to export their own brand of
authoritarianism, and even if they did it is far from certain
that it would find fertile ground in Latin America. However,
China’s rise may well lead to competition in Latin America
with the United States which might have unforeseen
consequences, but it is unlikely that this competition would
spark the type of conflict that would lead to unilateral
American interventions. Political scientist and Sino-Latin
America relations specialists He Li, writes that China’s
relationship with the United States is so much more
important than anything they would likely gain from
aggressively expanding into Latin America, that they will
likely maintain a cautious Latin American policy. 32
Still there are those who view international politics as a zero
sum game and so China’s investments in Latin America
represent a loss of American influence in the region and a
potential security threat.33 While this is still a minority view,
the outbreak of a conflict in Asia that saw the U.S. and China
on opposite sides could quickly and drastically change
perceptions of Chinese influence in Latin America, similar to
the way the outbreak of the Korean War shifted American
perceptions of Soviet influence in the region. If the Cold War
was able to turn Guatemala into a security threat, conflict
between the United States and China would almost certainly
32
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turn Venezuela, by one metric the largest recipient of
Chinese aid and investment in Latin America, into a major
worry for American policymakers. 34
Finally, the expansion of drug cartels into Central America is
another scenario that could lead to a reemergence of U.S.
intervention in the region. The aggressive actions taken by
the Mexican government in the last few years against drug
cartels has pushed many of them out of Mexico and into
places like Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.35 The
drug cartels’ ability to infiltrate local governments and law
enforcement in Mexico was one of the most frightening
examples of their power and if the Mexican state, which is
strong by comparison, was susceptible to such infiltration the
threats to these Central American governments are grave.
The danger of a narco-state developing in Central America is
perhaps the most likely scenario for the reemergence of a
policy of American intervention in the region, for several
reasons. First, for nearly twenty years the United States has
taken an especially firm stance on narcotics, which has
focused as much on interdicting foreign supply as on curbing
domestic demand. While this type of war on drugs has been
far from successful, it appears to have succeeded in breaking
the power of the Colombian cartels. This limited success
could serve as a template and a precedent for the U.S.
military to take aggressive action in Central America if the
cartels began to expand their influence there. Second, though
34
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America has many partners in its war on drugs, this
cooperation is typically bilateral. Given the relative
weakness of the States of Central America it is likely that
any bilateral cooperation with the United States to combat
the drug trade would be in fact American dominated
initiatives that could lead to greater involvement in their
internal affairs. It is possible to imagine a scenario where
American policymakers believe the governments of these
States to be so compromised that it would pursue unilateral
action to combat the trade. Third, these cartels’ reputation for
brutal violence and mass killing along with the damage their
trade does to American society could nullify what otherwise
might be strong domestic opposition to any intervention in
Central America, especially if Americans believe the
problem could be taken care of quickly. Those Americans
who demand increasingly harsh sentencing for drug
defenders domestically would surely argue, as President H.
W. Bush did against Noriega, that the United States cannot
win the war on drugs at home if they lose it in Central
America. They could also cite Operation Just Cause as a
precedent that unilateral interventions in such cases can be
effective, relatively low cost, and even popular.
American policymakers are not oblivious to the dangers of
the drug trade moving into Central America and have been
working with governments in the region to combat the trade
and prevent further penetration.36 Recognizing the problem
early and formulating a response to it is certainly better than
being caught unaware, but it is not necessarily a sure way of
preventing the need for intervention or further involvement.
Taking a firm stance against drug cartels in Central America
36
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could be the first step towards a policy where the United
States assumes responsibility for Central American security.
A similar sequence of events happened at the Washington
Conference of 1907 when Central American leaders and
American diplomats gathered to sign agreements intended to
end revolutions in there. The leaders agreed to stay neutral in
Central American civil wars and also to deny recognition to
any regimes that came to power through revolution. 37
Contrary to expectations, the agreements did not prevent
revolutions but did place more pressure on the United States
to act to prevent them since the United States assumed the
unofficial role of the guarantor of the agreements signed. 38
Decisive involvement in issues in Latin America for the U.S.
has sometimes been a recipe for future interventions rather
than quicker solutions.
That none of these scenarios seem especially imminent is a
testament to the development of the U.S.- Latin American
relationship in the past several years and also an
acknowledgement that American foreign policy has been,
and still is, largely focused elsewhere. Yet, all of these
scenarios contain a possible set of circumstances that might
once again bring about a convergence between Latin
American issues and the major fears and aspirations of
American foreign policy, and so push Latin American issues
back up near the top of the American foreign policy agenda.
Given the perceived low costs intervention in Latin America
if democracy is threatened, American interests are in danger
of being supplanted, or drug cartels seem to be on the verge
37
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of taking over a small state calls for intervention will surely
follow and over time could become irresistible.
CONCLUSION
The frequency of American interventions in Latin America
cannot be explained by security and economic interests
alone. This essay has argued that two other factors need to
be taken into account to explain why interventions have been
so common. First, immense differences in size and influence
between the United States and the States of Latin America
make interventions appear to be a low risk solution to crises
that threaten American interests there. Second, when
American fears about and aspirations for Latin America
converge with the general fears and aspirations of American
foreign policy interventions become much more likely. For
the last two decades the absence of such a convergence has
prevented Latin America from gaining the level of
importance necessary for American policymakers to consider
intervention as a possible policy response to regional crises.
However, the foundation on which previous policies of
intervention have been built still exists and so it would be
overly optimistic to think such a policy could not reemerge.
Robert Pastor described U.S.-Latin American relations as a
“whirlpool” in 2001, but argued persuasively that it was a
trap that both parties could exit by shifting their perceptions
of each other and their definitions of sovereignty. 39 Ten years
later, whether the United States and Latin America have
permanently “exited” this whirlpool is still unclear. During
the twenty-two years of the Good Neighbor policy,
39
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interventions seemed to be consigned to the past, only to
reemerge suddenly when the fear of communism proliferated
during the early Cold War. Time will tell whether the
Western Hemisphere has truly entered a new era in its interstate relations, or whether the past twenty-two years have
been another long hiatus from an American interventionists
policy while it was occupied elsewhere. The U.S. response to
the next major crisis in U.S.-Latin American relations where
the issues in question converge with the broader issues of
American foreign policy will go some way towards
answering this question.
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